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| Registros recuperados: 20 | |
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| Glebe, Thilo W.; Latacz-Lohmann, Uwe. |
| This paper develops an extended general equilibrium model of international trade in order to analyze the welfare effects of agricultural trade liberalization if a large country influences its terms of trade by means of environmental policy. We derive globally optimal first-best and second-best environmental and trade policy combinations as a benchmark for assessing the trade-distorting character of strategically motivated environmental policies and demonstrate that if second-best rather than first-best policies are chosen as a benchmark the conclusions may differ not only in magnitude but also in direction. We further demonstrate that if a Pigouvian instrument is transformed into a strategic environmental policy, following trade liberalization, the global... |
| Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation |
Palavras-chave: International Relations/Trade. |
| Ano: 2004 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/20277 |
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| Schilizzi, Steven; Latacz-Lohmann, Uwe. |
| Building on available theory, this work uses controlled laboratory experiments to investigate the budgetary and the economic performance of competitive tenders for allocating conservation contracts to landholders. Experiments have been replicated in two different countries to check for robustness of results. We find that auctions outperform the more traditional fixed-price programs only in the one-shot setting. With repetition, the auctions quickly lose their edge. The budget-constrained auction performs similarly to the target-constrained in the one-shot setting but appears more robust to repetition. Our results suggest that previous estimates of conservation auction performance are too optimistic, and we propose a method for improving such estimates. |
| Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation |
Palavras-chave: Resource /Energy Economics and Policy. |
| Ano: 2007 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/10436 |
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| Breustedt, Gunnar; Latacz-Lohmann, Uwe; Schilizzi, Steven. |
| Der vorliegende Artikel untersucht die Effizienz unterschiedlicher Ausgestaltungen von Auktionen zur Auswahl von Landwirten an Umweltprogrammen mittels eines ökonomischen Experimentes. Es wird eine Preisauktion, bei der die Leistung des Landwirts fixiert ist und er ein monetäres Mindestgebot für ein Teilnahmeentgelt abgeben soll, mit zwei unterschiedlichen Mengenauktionen verglichen, bei denen die Entgeltzahlung für den Landwirt fixiert ist und er aus unterschiedlichen Maßnahmen mit unterschiedlicher Leistung ein Angebotsbündel zusammenstellen soll. In der ersten Auktionsrunde ist die Leistung (=Stickstoffreduktion) je Euro Teilnahmeentgelt bei der Preisauktion signifikant höher als für die Mengenauktionen. Allerdings sind die Lerneffekte zwischen den... |
| Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation |
Palavras-chave: Auktion; Ökonomisches Experiment; Umweltprogramm. |
| Ano: 2007 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/7607 |
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| Latacz-Lohmann, Uwe; Hodge, Ian D.. |
| The present paper reviews the development of agri-environmental policy in Europe and assesses its prospects. While it does so from a predominantly UK perspective, there are many common features of the experience and policy choices across the majority of Member States. The first generation of agri-environmental measures applied command-and-control regulation for the prevention of pollution. Second-generation measures pay farmers for providing environmental public goods. The emphasis on ‘amenity’ derived from the maintenance of agricultural production systems contrasts with policy approaches in Australia and the USA. Well-designed incentive schemes constitute ‘quasi-markets’ for public goods, correcting for a pre-existing market failure. Problems in the... |
| Tipo: Journal Article |
Palavras-chave: Agricultural and Food Policy; Environmental Economics and Policy. |
| Ano: 2003 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/116179 |
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| Schilizzi, Steven; Latacz-Lohmann, Uwe. |
| Buying environmental services from private landholders using tendering mechanisms are usually subject to a budget constraint. Auction theory has mostly focused on target-constrained auctions and is not well developed for this type of auction. This paper examines the predictive capacity of a simple model developed for budget-constrained tenders, already used to design new conservation programs, by submitting it to controlled lab experiments. We study the capacity of the model to predict both experimental bids and the performance of the auction institution, based on the kind of limited information typically available to a conservation agency. We conclude there exists an optimal level of information on bidders’ costs, neither too large nor to small, making... |
| Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation |
Palavras-chave: Auctions; Procurement; Tenders; Conservation; Learning; Economic experiments. |
| Ano: 2009 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/48171 |
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| Registros recuperados: 20 | |
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